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Abstract
Financial bubbles have presented a challenge for the financial markets for a long time and
caused steep losses for many investors. This thesis has two main goals relating to financial bubbles. The
first is to try to determine if it is possible to find out if a financial bubble is forming. To accomplish that,
the economic theories that govern bubble formation and burst are analyzed and the models that exist to
predict bubble formation are discussed. A new model is suggested and is applied in the US financial
markets to determine if any of the asset classes are currently risking the development of a bubble. This
analysis suggests that one asset class is likely to be developing a bubble and this thesis further discusses
this asset class.
The second objective of this thesis is to suggest alternatives that prudent investors could
introduce to protect themselves from some of the worst consequences of bubbles. This thesis will
suggest models inspired by completely different industries: the air transportation industry with its high
safety standards; the oil industry with its long-term planning; and the socially responsible investment
industry, with its self-regulatory structure.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert C. Merton
Title: School of Management Distinguished Professor of Finance
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1 Introduction
Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been an increased interest in the concept of "financial bubble".
Newspapers regularly publish news discussing and speculating about potential bubbles developing
either in the US or overseas. But what is a financial bubble and is it possible to know if one if forming?
Or is it the type of event that is only possible to determine ex-post, once the bubble busted? The
objective of this thesis is to apply the current theories related to financial bubbles to assess the current
situation of the US financial markets. Some of the key bubble theories will be reviewed and a model to
identify vulnerabilities will be suggested.
A second and equally relevant question is what a well-informed investor should do if he or she knows or
suspects that a bubble is forming in any given market. Evidence will be presented that, despite
important early warnings given from Alan Greenspan (1) about the Technology Bubble that formed in
the late 1990's, the market largely ignored his warnings. This thesis will address institutional solutions
that could help risk-averse investors to protect themselves from bubbling markets.
To accomplish these goals, this thesis is organized into four main sections. The first section will define
what constitutes a financial bubble and present some key theories and models that were developed to
understand the bubble behavior. Furthermore, the first section will also shed light on some of the
relevant bubble examples in the past, such as the Tulip Mania in Amsterdam and the Great Depression,
and will also shed light on how the theories that were proposed adhere to the past bubbles. The second
section will apply and combine the current theories and models develop a framework to forecast
bubbles. The third section will apply this framework to the key assets in the US financial markets in
order to determine the asset classes that are currently most "likely" or more "exposed" to bubble type
of events. Finally, the last section of the thesis will propose functional and institutional alternatives that
could offset some of the stronger consequences of the bubbles. As this thesis will further address,
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current research suggests that it is impossible to completely eliminate the formation of financial bubbles
or the economic cycles that accompany them. Therefore this thesis will not try to generate new ways of
avoiding bubbles, but instead, will suggest new approaches for prudent investors and other market
participants to avoid some of the more severe effects that accompany a financial bubble burst.
2 Theory and examples of bubbles
This section will present a definition of what constitutes a financial bubble and discuss the current
theories that explains the behaviors that lead to the formation and burst of financial bubbles.
Furthermore, this section will also present some of the key financial bubbles of history and address how
these bubbles adhere to the current bubble theories.
2.1 Bubble definition
"The classic definition of a bubble is people buying on false expectations about future
prices, and buying with the hope of selling in the future."
Professor Yoshihisa Nakashima (2)
According to Charles Kindleberger et al. (3) Financial Bubble is the term given to an increase in the price
of an asset that cannot be explained by the intrinsic value. There is a variety of definitions of intrinsic
value and Jeffrey Hooke (4) defines it as the result of a valuation technique that forecasts the future
streams of cash flow of any security and then discounts these streams of cash flows to obtain the
present value of the cash flows. Therefore, by definition, in order to apply the 'intrinsic value' technique
12
to value a security, it is necessary to forecast different financial and operational parameters of the
underlying business or asset. The need to forecast makes the intrinsic value of an asset "subjective"
since forecasting is by definition a subjective process. There is no real mathematical formulation that
provides a correct, unique and error-free estimation. Estimations can and do rely on mathematical
frameworks, but they also heavily rely on judgment and the ability of the market participants to
understand the available information and to judge the future based on these forecasts.
As a consequence of the subjective nature of the forecasting needed for the calculations of the intrinsic
value of an asset, it follows that it is also subjective to determine if a price bubble is forming. This is the
reason why every financial bubble in history was difficult to spot properly ex-ante.
The Kindleberger framework states that a bubble is a part of a cycle that starts with a traditional, well-
functioning and well-priced market that then suffers a shock and deviates from its intrinsic value, also
termed the "fundamental's price". This shock makes the participants in the market believe that a new
trend is emerging, either in efficiency, in profitability, in growth or in any other valuation parameter and
that the prices should be calculated with a new forecast for this given parameter and, as a consequence,
prices will converge to a new and higher level.
This behavior appears to generate a self-fulfilling prophecy, at least for some period of time. The more
people believe in the new trend, more buyers come to the market and these new buyers push prices up.
The more prices go up, the more people start to believe that the new valuation model is correct and
true and the more they are encouraged to buy. This dynamic evolves until the market runs out of new
buyers, and then the sellers dominate the price-making dynamic. At this point, the new valuation is
often no longer regarded to be right and the new buyers will rely on the old valuation to price the
market and push the values to the normal levels, or perhaps even to a lower value in an undershoot.
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Examples of extreme valuations include: the purchase of a tulip bulb (which is the reproductive organ of
a tulip, that hopefully will generate a tulip within 6 months) for the price of 5 years of common labor
income. Another example is to price the land of the Imperial Temple in Tokyo at the same price as the
entire state of California. Those are extremes prices and valuations reached close to the burst phase of
the cycle. These examples will be further discussed in the 'Examples of relevant financial bubbles'
section of this thesis.
Carmen M. Heinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (3) call this dynamic the "this time is different". According to
their research, market players are aware of past crises and bubbles and the severe loss incurred from
them, but still their cognitive biases, such as greed and fear lead them to behave in a way that is
inconsistent with past experience.
Another key factor that increases the mispricing is abundant and cheap credit. Vikram Mansharamani (5)
states that low interest rates and high leverage play a key role in fostering this dynamic, allowing the
market agents to further increase the valuations of future streams of cash flow, given the low interest
rates. Furthermore, cheap credit leads to the amplification of the mispricing, both in terms of values and
also in terms of anticipating the time of the occurrence of its peak. As it will be argued in the following
sections, high leverage played a key role in many of the largest financial bubbles, such as the Tulip
Mania in Amsterdam.
Finally, according to Andrew Lo (6), financial crises that end in bubble type of events, are consequences
of human behavior and cannot be completely avoided by any legislation or regulation. They can only be
understood. That is already a powerful tool to help society to avoid some of the worst consequences of
the bubbles.
There are some opponents of the bubble concept, who often voice their opinions during the boom stage
of the cycle. Often some market participants make the case that bubbles cannot exist and that the
14
market is completely efficient and that prices are always correct and reflect all available data. Historical
examples will be offered in the "historical examples" section, showing important cases in history in
which the markets were strongly mispriced. Some of the opposition to the bubble concept is related to
the agents that benefit from bubbles. For example, the recent real estate bubble in the US is now
regarded as a very well established and a very serious case of financial bubble. However, that was not
the case even in the months preceding the burst. The following statement from a CNN article
exemplifies this situation.
..."New home prices will be immediately impacted because of increased construction
costs," says NAR economist Lawrence Yun, "and that will filter down to existing home
prices as well." That's because as new house prices rise, more homebuyers will consider
existing homes, increasing the demand (and prices) for them....
National Association of Realtors, September 14, 2005, obtained from the
CNN.com website (7)
This statement was issued at the peak of the real estate boom, when real estate prices were at an all-
time high. The graph below presents the evolution of the real estate prices in the US.
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Figure 1: Housing Prices Index Evolution and selected news
S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index (US)
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It is clear that some market agents can benefit from bubbles, at least for a period of time. In this case
the National Association of Realtors and all other realtors profit from a high level of real estate
transactions. The realtors are frequently compensated with a commission, and therefore have an
incentive to stimulate the maximum number of deals. Years after the bust it is easy to realize that the
realtors were only interested in further expanding the market activity as long as they possibly could.
Citigroup's chief executive, Charles 0. Prince, provided a statement to the New York Times that clearly
exemplifies this behavior:
..."As long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance," he told The
Financial Times on Monday, adding, "We're still dancing."
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CNN.com, July 10, 2007 (8)
The proponents of the non-existence of financial bubbles often rely on Paul Samuelson's (9) hypothesis
of efficient markets, which states that all information available should be reflected in the price of a
security. This thesis will analyze some of the key assumptions of Samuelson's hypothesis and will
demonstrate that often markets fail to fulfill all the assumptions. Some key historical examples will be
offered as evidence of the existence of bubble and also used to analyze the recurring patterns on the
bubbles.
The next section will discuss the current theories related with the bubble dynamics and also will discuss
one theory that tries to explain and model the entire bubble cycle. The thesis's goal with the review of
these theories is both to understand the bubble dynamic and also to look for recurring patterns that can
be used to forecast building bubbles.
2.2 Theories related to the bubble dynamics
The key assumption that drives the proper pricing of assets, or instead their mispricing, is the ability of
the market players to use the available information with judgment and rationality to find a proper value
to any given asset or security. Some theories and hypotheses help to understand the way that the
market participants determine the proper prices for the assets and securities and therefore can cast
light to the dynamics that govern the mispricing as well. These theories will be explained in the next
section, starting with the well-known Efficient Market Hypothesis.
17
The Efficient Market Hypothesis
One important hypothesis regarding price discovery, the Efficient Market Hypothesis, developed by Paul
Samuelson (9) states that the market agents use all information available to form a security price and
also that this price embodies all information available. This hypothesis applies to tradable instruments
that are publicly available. The requirements for the Efficient Market Hypothesis are that the
participants of the market are on average correct, and that information is immediately incorporated in
the market. Two consequences if the Hypothesis holds true for a given market is that both prices are
correct and also that it is impossible to forecast the future price of a security, just based on past data.
These two consequences might be misinterpreted by market participants and help to start or build a
bubble. Since some of the requirements of the hypothesis might not hold true for a particular given
market, it is risky to assume that it holds, and it is not possible to use the Hypothesis to justify correct
prices, under these circumstances. Particularly the requirement that market participants are on average
correct is very strong, and it is probably the requirement that are not met on many of the bubble type of
events. As discussed in the previous section, the market participants must use forecasting techniques to
obtain the intrinsic value of a security. A wrong prediction of any parameter can lead to a wrong
intrinsic value and therefore the wrong price. if all the market participants commit the same estimation
or forecasting error, then, the Efficient Market Hypothesis requirement that market participants are on
average correct is not met.
If the Efficient Market Hypothesis does not hold for some markets, at least during a particular time
frame, the unwarranted belief that it is impossible to predict the future behavior of the price, and also
18
2.2.1
the equally unwarranted belief that the current price is correct, might give false confidence to investors
to buy assets that might be overpriced. This confidence might lead to further buying of a given asset or
security and then to further increase the mispricing, thus fueling the bubble.
If the Efficient Market Hypothesis held completely, all the time, there would be no boom and bust
behaviors in the markets at all. Prices would always perfectly reflect the real and correct valuations and
bubbles would never form in the first place. The mere existence of Booms and Busts, such as the ones
described in the "examples" section of this thesis, is evidence that markets are not completely efficient,
at least during some period of time.
2.2.2 The Adaptive Market Hypothesis
Andrew Lo (10) presents a different hypothesis to explain price formation, the Adaptive Market
Hypothesis. It argues that market players' cognitive bias might drive their behavior away from the
behavior expected by the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests markets in which the
participants are more worried about "survival" or their relative importance compared to others. In this
scenario, risk aversion changes over time and the "success" of some (probably early-adopters) generates
an incentive to other players to increase their risk tolerance or risk exposure.
The adaptive market hypothesis suggests that market players are mostly worried about survival. The
expected returns are not the key goals, but instead their abilities to survive under any circumstance.
One of the implications of Lo's hypothesis is that market participants are worried about "following the
herd". It is very easy for a money manager to explain that he lost money (or underperformed some
target), when the entire market is going down. On the other hand, it is very hard for the same money
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manager to explain losses (or performances below the target) when the market is booming. In this
sense, there is strong incentive for market participants to "surf" the waves and "dance" to the music.
Citigroup's chief executive, Charles 0. Prince, previously quoted statement clearly exemplifies this
behavior:
"As long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance," he told The
Financial Times on Monday, adding, "We're still dancing."
CNN.com, July 10, 2007 (8)
Carroll's Three Lenses Framework provides a deeper insight into how professional money manager firms
could be influenced by the behavioral bias that are pillars of the Adaptive Market Hypothesis and offers
a better understanding of the behaviors that lead to the bubble formation.
2.2.3 The Three Lenses Framework
According to John Carroll (11), the behavior of individuals within organizations could be better explained
by the analysis of three different lenses. Each lens determines the course of action that the individual is
expected or stimulated to behave and the real action of each individual is a combination of the three
different stimuli. The first lens focuses on the structure and efficiency of operations. The Strategic
Design Lens views an organization in a way that fits perfectly with the idea of efficient markets,
proposing that the financial institutions, and their employees, should always behave in the most
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efficient way to achieve their objective and functions, based on its mission, resources and available
information.
However, two other lenses complete the framework and combined provide a better understanding of an
organization. The Political Lens maps and identifies the behaviors of the individuals that are oriented
toward their own individual or group goals and not to the institution goals and functions. Such a view
can be and often is conflicting with the Strategic Design Lens. To complete the framework, the Cultural
Lens tends to map and predict the individual's behavior and also organizational actions based on the
culture of the organization.
The political goal of an individual to maximize its own compensation might conflict with an organization
goal of maximizing returns, restricted to a given limit of risk. Furthermore, the cultural bias of a given
share of the finance industry that "The good ones beat the markets" might also lead to a risk taking
behavior that might be inconsistent with the mission of the organization.
Combining the Adaptive Market Hypothesis and also the Three Lenses Framework, it is possible to
identify a series of stimuli to market participants that lead to bubble fueling. The market participants
aim to continue to exist as their main goal according to the AMH. At least for the large institutions that
manage money, there is an incentive to be in the "top quartile" of performance to attract more
resources, instead of losing resources. This gives mangers an incentive to take more risks than their best
judgment would recommend, buying positions in markets that they might even believe are overpriced.
The only explanation for this is that they do not have the right incentive to be contrarian to the market
or at least to be neutral to the booming market that often precedes the bubbles. This incentive is key to
the protection of risk adverse investors that want protection from bubbles. The last section of this thesis
will address protective alternatives for risk adverse investors and once again address the money
managers' incentive issue.
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The Theory of Reflexivity
George Soros (12) argues that markets are not independent of the agents that study the markets.
According to this theory, the study of the market by itself, including the research and the development
of valuations, influences the behavior of the investors and other market participants. As a consequence,
according to Soros, it is impossible to determine if a movement in the market is a response to the reality
of the market or a response to some of the studies that were conducted regarding the market.
This theory further provides insight into how bubbles evolve. Some market participants in any given
market, (such as real estate) might have the incentive to forecast the asset prices in an upward trend,
stimulating further inflow of resources into such market. One example is the National Realtors
Association, previously quoted on this thesis, which forecasted continued growth of real estate prices,
even in the prices peak of 2005. Sell-side researchers are also frequently accused of targeting their
recommendations according to the overall interests of the security firm that they work.
These actions from markets participants might lead to an inflow of resources that actually push prices
up, not in a real way, but instead in a speculative and mispriced way.
2.2.5 The Minsk Model of Booms and Busts
Kindleberger argues that the Hyman Minsk (13) model is the most adequate model to explain the boom
and bust behavior. The model identifies four distinct stages or phases that govern the booms and busts.
The first stage is the stable market, in which pricings do not deviate from the fundamentals. According
22
2.2.4
to Minsk, if the interest rates stay low for too long during a stable market, it fosters the development of
the mispricing, which is the second stage. That is the "mania", a stage in which there is a large capital
infusion into a market which propels the prices to new levels that are far from the fundamentals. This
stage is often (but not always) accompanied by an intense expansion in credit, that further drives prices
away from the fundamentals. The next stage is the "pop", in which rationality returns to the markets
and that leads to a selloff of the assets. This stage is often very short and one in which an intense panic
develops, forcing prices to quickly return to the more appropriate levels, or to the values implied by the
"fundamentals". The recovery period is an often long lasting period, of deleverage and in which the
prices of the assets are often depressed below the fundamentals. The next sections will discuss each of
these stages in more detail.
Formation
Minsk model proposes that the markets are essentially instable and that bubbles tend to form naturally
under low interest rate environments. The very stability of prices in the periods with low interest rates
by itself is a factor that can trigger a boom and bust cycle. According to Mansharamani (5), investors
become eager to get new and more profitable investment opportunities and become prone to "good
news" that changes the dynamics of the markets and drive up the prices of a given asset.
The turning point that drives the market away from the equilibrium to the new stage is the shock. The
shock is a displacement in the markets that makes the participants believe that the dynamics of the
market will be different in the future. It influences the expectations related the value of any given asset
class - that might be the profitability, the growth of sales, the reduction of costs or a combination of
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these. These new circumstances in the market are often unlike any other seen before and therefore
pose a significant challenge for the market participants to properly price the effects of these shocks. One
key example of shock is the "invention of the internet", which, combined with the great improvement in
information technology and communication provided a cost reduction to all companies, as well as a new
sector to the economy. That was certainly a relevant event that should influence the prices of all assets
in the markets in the proportion of the true benefits generated. According to this line of reasoning the
market was correct to incorporate a change in the price. But what the market sometimes fails to do is
price this "new eras" in the proper way, leading the way for a bubble. The expansion stage of the cycle
addresses how the market participants incorporate these new prices into the market.
Expansion
In the expansion stage, according to the Minsk model, the market participants start to experience an
increase in the price of a given asset. The early entrants in the market obtain the first profits. The
"rationality" of the market is justified with strong backing from the shock. According to Kindleberger
defense of Minsk's model, it is possible to identify "high logic "among the traders during this stage. The
rationality is justified by the "changes in the fundaments" induced by the shock. It is hard, however to
properly distinguish weather the new valuation is used to guide the price trajectory or if the valuation is
just used as an excuse for market participants to trade at the new prices.
According to Kindleberger, there is also a cognitive bias at the same time - all participants in this market
have experienced profits up to this point. Therefore there is a high incentive for all players, both
investors and advisors alike, to recommend the participation in this market.
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This dynamic by itself is not destabilizing. One could argue that it could only accelerate the convergence
of prices to the new level induced by the shock, and not beyond. In this sense, the shock would be a real
positive economic gain experienced by the market. Sometimes that is case, but in other instances,
however, some of the cognitive bias presented before - both in the Adaptive Market Hypothesis and
also in the Three Lenses Framework, stimulate the market participants to continue to invest and to take
a bullish view on the market for as long as they possibly can.
At this point, according to Kindleberger, the means became the end. Investors are buying because prices
are increasing and prices are increasing because investors are buying. The investors no long want to get
the revenues or benefits from owning the asset, but instead drive their decision to buy solely on the
false expectation to sell it later for a profit.
That is the stage in which the market as a whole no longer behaves rationally and that it is headed to the
next stage which is the bust of the bubble.
During the expansion stage, the market might experience a great increase in indebtedness. Many of the
market participants might borrow at low rates to invest in the booming assets. This trade seems as good
trade for the investor: during the expansion stage, the market frequently still experience low interest
rates and low investment yields in many of the asset classes. The prospect to borrow at a low interest
rate and invest in a short-term high return investment seems highly attractive to many investors.
These highly levered investors will pose a key problem in the final stage of the cycle - the bust or the
bubble popping.
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The critical moment - the Bubble "explosion"
It is during the explosion that a cycle can be effectively detected. Up to the previous stage, different
opinions could provide support both for an upward trend in price as a secular and lasting dislocation as
well as other opinions could suggest an unsustainable price trajectory. It is only the intense market
reaction in the bust that confirms that prices trajectory was unsustainable.
According to Minsk, the heavily indebted investors play a key role in the Bubble explosion. Firstly, they
are exposed to both to revenues and also to costs in their "trade". Their cost arises from the cost to
service the debt incurred to buy the securities. Their revenues can only come from the yield on their
asset (such as rent, dividends or coupons) plus the price change component. During the expansion, they
are benefited from the positive variation in prices, leading to profits. Now, as new investors cease to
enter the market, the price variation tends to be close to zero in the first instance and, later on,
negative.
Many events can lead to the critical transition from the growth in prices to a stability trajectory or a
distress one. The distress period, is a period of financial hazard. In this period, frequently many firms
face the risk of not being able to service or roll their debts. The distress might start from a bad harvest, a
sharp increase in commodities prices or by a perception in the market that there is an overall
overleverage. Usually under distress situations, banks and other firms tend to reduce credit, particularly
to subprime borrowers and to increase the interest rates.
This change in the lending pattern has a particularly severe impact to the heavily indebted investors. As
the price variations cease to be positive, and price variations are for some period of time close to zero or
negative, these investors no longer profit from the market, since the yields on the assets are not enough
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to service their debt. Their incentive is now changed, and they now have the incentive to sell and exit
the market. This puts an extra selling pressure that further depresses prices, in a process called by
Mansharamani "Asset deflation".
Once some players start to sell, then there is a downward pressure in the market. This pressure might
influence other players to sell, particularly those who invested in the market solely because of the
upward trend in prices. This is a behavior that will drive prices back to their proper fundamentals in a
somehow slow fashion, as was experienced in the Japanese Real Estate market in the 80's. This would
characterize the "slow" end of a bubble.
There can also be a "crash" in the market - a situation in which a big or relevant institution fails or goes
bankrupt and therefore the market agents enter into Panic mode and start to sell their risk assets and
search for low risk, government securities. This is the "fast" end for a bubble.
The next section will present a mathematical overview that aims to identify bubble behaviors by
analyzing the prices patterns in a market.
2.2.6 Economic models biases
Some of the economic models discussed present issues that might make the bubble prediction even
more challenging. The first and most important issue is the survivorship bias. Now, that the world is
dominated by capitalist countries and where the US is the leading power, it is easy to misleading think
that it was easy to forecast prices for stocks as compared to the growth of US economy or the world.
However, during the times of some of the crashes that will be presented in the next section, investors
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did not have a lot of the information that now seems "embedded" in our common knowledge. For
example, it is clear now that capitalism won over communism, but that was not a clear assumption
during the 1930, and S&P 500, or any other stock indexes, should reflect this information or this risk.
Another example would be the comparison of US and Argentina GDP in 1900 which were the same, but
both countries experienced extremely different GDP evolutions, something that should be priced in the
stocks. The economic models often fail to include these adjustments which are probably the gaps that
make them vulnerable to criticism. However, the greater challenge probably comes from the downside
estimations, since risks can come from many sources. Financial bubbles, on the other hand, emerge
from unsustainable high valuations and the high valuations tend to be the ones in which the economic
models presents fewer biases.
2.3 Examples of relevant financial bubbles
"I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men"
Sir Isaac Newton (14), after losing money in his investment in the South Sea Company
The framework proposed by Minsk and expanded and detailed by Kindleberger et al. presents a
guideline to understand the evolution of a financial cycle that ends with a burst in a bubble behavior.
The following sections will review some of the key bubbles in history and will particularly address how
each of the following crises combines with the Mink framework. Some key elements that will be part of
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the analysis are: the shock that drives the system away from the equilibrium, the credit propeller that
fuels the boom and also, if any, the crash situation.
This section will draw information from some key bibliographical references. Particularly the following
sources are the pillars of the discussion: "Boombustology: Spotting Financial Bubbles Before They Burst"
by Vikram Mansharamani (5), "Famous First Bubbles -The fundamentals of Early Manias" by Peter M.
Garber (15) and also Doug French's "The Dutch monetary environment during Tulipmania" on The
quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics (16)-
2.3.1 Tulip mania in Amsterdam
To better understand the Tulip Mania that took place in Amsterdam in 1637, it is necessary to
understand both the situation of the country and the nature of the underlying asset of the speculative
run - the tulip.
After achieving its independence from Spain in 1581, Netherlands experienced a very stable and
prosperous period, sometimes referred to as "The Dutch Golden Age." The reduction of the military
cost, after the independence, combined with a strong overseas trading activity led the country to
experience a period of great wealth creation. According to Garber (15), the Dutch trading position was
so prominent that they enjoyed almost monopolies in the trade routes to the East Indies and Japan.
Furthermore they also made several land conquests overseas, founding the city of New York in America
and conquering a part of Brazil.
Garber also suggests that Nederlands enjoyed the position of the top financial power in Europe during
the early 1600's, something that provided the country with vast resources and also power.
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The table below illustrates the expansionist monetary environment experienced in the Nederlands
during the 1630's.
Table 1 - Total Mint Output of the South Netherlands, 1598-1789 (in guilders)
Year Gold Silver Copper Total
1628-29
1630-32
1633-35
1636-68
1639-41
1642-44
153,010
364,414
476,996
2,917,826
2,950,150
2,763,979
2,643,732
8,838,411
16,554,079
20,172,257
8,102,988
1,215,645
4,109
6,679
47,834
2,800,851
9,209,503
17,031,075
23,090,083
11,053,138
4,027,458
Source: Jan A Van Houtte and Leon Van Buyten (1977, p. 100), as quoted by Doug French in the "The Dutch
Monetary Environment During Tulipmania" (15)
As a consequence, the country started to invest in improving its infrastructure and many of the new
wealthy families started to improve their real estate and to buy arts. There was also greater demand for
flowers in general.
The tulip is a particular type of flower. Firstly it is not original from Western Europe and was only
introduced in Holland in 1563. The flower has a reproductive cycle that naturally makes it difficult to
quickly increase the supply. Tulips can be grown mostly by two ways: by planting the seeds or by a
cultivation of bulbs. According to Mansharamani, the process to plan seeds can take from 7-12 years to
generate new tulips, therefore making it a reproductive technique that is unable to increase supply of
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tulips in the short term. The alternative way to grow tulips is with the bulbs. The bulb is an underground
structure that can yield a low rate of reproduction and that needs proper care. This characteristic
restrains severely the availability of tulips, at least in the short run. Furthermore, the tulip bulbs have to
be kept in the ground for most of the year and they could only be uprooted and traded in the spring and
summer.
Tulips exist in more than 100 natural species and at least 6 varieties had great commercial value in the
early 1600's. This phenomenon made some particular, unique, kinds of tulips more expensive than
others.
The combination of the high demand for tulips (and other flowers) with the constrained supply of tulips
pushed prices to higher levels. As the prices increased, more and more people started to consider tulips
as an investment, instead of just a flower for decorative purposes, and started to buy tulips only to resell
in the future for a higher price. This stage is already a stage in which the means and the end of the
investment are changed and that leads to the development of a bubble.
Furthermore, there was a strong credit component in the mania. Since the tulip bulbs could only be
traded during the spring and summer months, traders developed a "futures contract." Those contracts
established that the buyers would buy the bulb and only receive them in March; however, the buyer
only had to pay an upfront value of 10% of the sale price. It was basically a structure in which it was
possible to buy on margin, with great leverage.
In November of 1636, in the top of the speculation period, tulip bulbs were traded for the prices of
decades of common job pay, what would be equivalent today of up to USD 450,000 for a single flower.
After the system ran out of bigger fools, during a traditional auction held in Amsterdam, in which no
buyers showed up, panic ensued and prices collapsed.
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The components of the Minsk Model which were present in this event:
Shock: The Independence of Holland and the great inflow of gold and silver from its international
trading activities.
Speculation: The constrained supply of tulips forced their prices to increase in response to the
increase in the demand, creating gain opportunity for short-term investors. This brought investors to the
market that were not considering the benefits of owning the tulips, but were only worried about the
increase in their value.
Fueling Credit: The cyclical nature of growing tulips fostered the development of the futures sale
contract, that in practice had the same effects as an increase in credit availability.
Crash event: Panic quickly ensued after an unsuccessful auction.
2.3.2 South Sea Company
The South Sea Company was an English company founded in 1711, with the official purpose to trade
with Spanish America. The company had a legal monopoly of the trade with Spanish America, even
thought that proved to be far less valuable than expected. The war between England and Spain never
allowed the South Sea Company to conduct any trade beyond occasional slave and textile shipments,
and the company never truly benefited from its monopoly.
However, according to Temin et al. (17), the South Sea Company had a very important function. It
helped the Government of England to reshape its sovereign debt. English long-term bonds and annuities
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were trading at a discount, since investors were pricing the perceived default risk. The South Sea
Company, in its first meaningful business operation, according to Temin et al., bought Government debt
in exchange for stocks in 1719. With this exchange, the company received the interest from the
government; the bondholders saw their securities price increasing. It seemed like a good trade for every
participant, except for the fact that the total risk of the system was not reduced, but only redistributed.
The risk premium of the government bonds and annuities should have been reflected on the South Sea
Company books and therefore on the pricing of the stocks, but that connection was blurred by the
speculation. The company eventually obtained a license to buy all the outstanding sovereign debt of
England, which further fueled the speculation on its stocks.
The dynamics evolved in a way that pricing the shares of the company was based on the expectation of
a trading with South America, something that never happened, and was fueled by an accounting
distortion in the accounting of the recently acquired sovereign debt.
Not surprisingly, in 1720, the stock crashed and share prices dropped 70%. The figure below presents
the evolution of the prices of the South Sea Company shares as well as the investments of Sir Isaac
Newton.
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Figure 2: South Sea Company share prices
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Marc Faber, Editor and Publisher of "The Gloom, Boom & Doom Report."
The components of the Mink Model present in this event:
Shock: The monopoly of the trade rights with South America was an innovative asset that the market
was unaware how to properly price.
Speculation: The company issued a sizable amount of stocks, but these were exchanged for sovereign
debt, and therefore a small fraction ended up in free float. With that, the availability of the stocks was
low. Furthermore the Company lent money freely, taking its own shares as collateral. It also reduced the
supply of shares.
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Fueling Credit: The strategy to lend against its own shares increased the leverage that investors
could achieve, further fueling the bubble.
Crash event: Panic quickly ensued after books were disclosed in 1720.
2.3.3 The Great Depression in the US
After winning WW1, the US experienced a period of significant growth and prosperity. The increase in
industrialization and manufacturing was improving the productivity; the recently invented automobile
was a new and high selling product. The highways under construction were connecting the country and
making trade and travel easier and less expensive.
According to Mansharamani, the invention of the radio, the airplane and several other new technologies
allowed room for the development of new business. Simultaneously, the Federal Reserve reduced their
rates to low levels, incentivizing lending activities. The very establishment of the Federal Reserve System
in 1913, was also a key milestone that many considered that would prevent speculation and bubbles to
ever occur again.
This combination of elements fueled the national sentiment, and led to the mindset that Reinhart et al.
call "this time is different." However the change of means and end invaded many of the markets.
According to Mansharamani, regular people with little to no knowledge about the stock market started
to invest in stocks. People started to invest not because they wanted to get the risk exposure or the
dividends from the stock market, but only because they saw other people making short-term profits.
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Another example of speculation took place in Miami and Southern Florida. The combination of
automobiles and roads allowed a far greater number of people to travel, and the region became much
more attractive. The market evolved into a system in which the purchase of a real estate property only
required a 10% upfront payment. The remaining value would be split into installments starting 30 days
from the purchase. According to Mansharamani, at some point during the speculative run, 90% of all
purchases were targeted to be resold within the next 30 days.
Of course, the combination of speculation and high leverage fell apart when the greater fools refused to
show up. In the well-known events of October 1929, the US stock market fell rapidly and the
construction market faced a strong downturn.
The components of the Mink Model present in this event:
Shock: The discovery of new technologies, combined with the victory in WW1, fueled the national
sentiment in the US and pushed real estate and stock prices to new levels.
Speculation: Run in different markets, including stocks and also real estate.
Fueling Credit: Low interest rates set by the FED and the development of real-estate "upfront"
contracts
Crash event: No "key" event. Panic ensued after the New York Stock Exchange session of Oct 29 th
1929.
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2.3.4 The Japanese Real Estate Bubble
Economically, Japan presented a great recovery in the years following WW2. The country benefited from
the support received by Western powers, particularly from the US, and re-built its infrastructure. In the
early 1980's, according to Mansharamani, Japan was frequently regarded as able to surpass the US and
to become the largest economy in the world.
This impressive growth fueled the society's confidence and as a consequence the construction business
prospered and the real estate prices increased dramatically. The Japanese banks, highly capitalized
during this period and among the largest in the world, increased lending activities, particularly in the
mortgage market.
Furthermore, the Bank of Japan reduced the interest rates to 2.5% in January 1986, further incentivizing
the lending activities. According to Kindleberger et al., money seemed to be free at that time, which is a
common characteristic to the starting stage of a cycle that leads to a bubble.
As the lending market increased greatly, so did the prices. Japan experienced some of the highest
valuations recorded in history for its land and property. According to Christopher Wood (18), the US is
geographically 25 times larger than Japan and had twice the population at that time, but still, according
to market prices, at that time all Japanese real estate combined totaled about four times the price of US
Real Estate.
These impressive land and real estate valuations were also reflected in company balance sheets. Since
the companies owned buildings and factories, the increase in their property values began to positively
influence the prices of the stock market, pushing these prices to extremes. To illustrate such extremes,
according to Mansharamani, the Japanese National Telephone Company traded for a total market
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capitalization that exceeded the entire market capitalization of all French and Swiss publicly traded
companies. Some sectors of the Nikkei index traded at P/E of 100 to 300. Considering that current P/E's
for the US is about 20, and historical averages tend to be lower than 20, it is fair to assume that the
prices of Japanese stock were extremely overpriced.
The trend in prices started to reverse as the Bank of Japan increased its short-term rates up to 6.0% in
1989. Furthermore, the Bank of Japan limited the amount that each bank could lend in new mortgages.
These two actions made it less attractive, if even possible, for new players to enter the real estate
market targeting short-term capital gains. The buyers that remained in the market were those really
interested in the benefit from the asset, rather than on the short-term gains. As a consequence, the
demand for real estate greatly reduced and so did the prices of real estate.
In the stock market, the tailwind, provided by real estate reversed. This pushed stock share prices down
as well in a combined process that has lasted 20 years.
The components of the Mink Model present in this event:
Shock: The recent strong growth of Japan to developed world income levels as well as the low interest
rates inflated the country's confidence.
Speculation: Many investors became aware of the increasing prices in real estate and invested
expecting to obtain capital gains. Furthermore, this behavior and dynamic spilled over and influenced
the stock market.
Fueling Credit: The low rates the Bank of Japan set up to 1986 were a key part of the fueling credit.
Furthermore, the estate tax code in Japan would heavily tax capital gains originating from the increase
in property prices, unless some offsetting protective action was taken. One of these offsetting actions,
according to Mansharamani, was to buy real estate with high leverage, since the mortgage was
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"deductible" in the estate tax. As a consequence, some investors bought highly priced real estate only
for tax reasons.
Crash event: Slow retraction ensued, starting with the increase in Bank of Japan short-term rates and
the institution of limitations of bank loan growth in 1989.
2.3.5 The Internet Bubble
The widespread introduction of personal computing and the advancements in communication
technology created a new industry in the US. This new industry, often called the Information Technology
industry, improved the economic outlook of the State of California and also of the US. This
phenomenon, combined with the new belief that the capitalism had won over communism in a
sustainable way set the foundations of the internet bubble. NASDAQ was the platform on which many of
the new companies, such as Microsoft and Oracle, were listed. The figure below presents the evolution
of the Price / Normalized Earnings from the NASDAQ Index compared to the S&P 500 Index.
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Figure 3: Price / Earnings evolutions
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It is possible to note that investors valued the entire NASDAQ index at 90 times Earnings, in a valuation
level never seen in the history of publicly traded equity. However, the "this time is different" mindset
made high growth expectations in this new market to justify such valuations.
Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time, noticed these extraordinary valuations at
which some of the technology stocks were trading. On December 5, 1996, the date in which the NADAQ
was priced at 1300 points, Greenspan (1) made the now famous "irrational exuberance" warning about
the lack of "rational" foundation for the NASDAQ prices. Despite of his warning, the NASDAQ index rose
all the way to 5048 points, or to 90 x P/E, to then burst. This case exemplifies the extent to which the
players believed in the new "trend" in the industry, since the market participants largely ignored
Greenspan's warning. Now the NASDAQ presents a P/E of about 20, still higher than the 16 exhibited by
the S&P 500 index, but within the long-term historical trends for equities.
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Shock: The end of communism and the victory of capitalism combined with the invention of the
Personal Computer and the Internet.
Speculation: Market participants started to invest based on the previous gains of other investors, and
prices and valuations reached all-time peaks.
Fueling Credit: The leverage was relatively low.
Crash event: Market participants adjusted their views on IT stocks after the Federal Reserve increased
the FED fund rates several times, reaching a peak of 6.5% yearly.
2.3.6 The 2008 US Housing Bubble
...These loans are made on the basis of the value of the property, not the ability
of the borrower to repay ...
Senator Christopher Dodd, U.S. Senate Banking Committee, March 22 2007 (19)
During the year of 2008, the US financial markets experienced some of the most volatile times since the
great depression. Relevant financial institutions failed, a significant number of families experienced the
foreclosure processes, and the S&P 500 Index lost 56% of its value (from 1561 points on December 9 th
2007 to 676 points on March 3rd, 2009) and the economy entered into a recession.
The table below exemplifies the effect of the crisis on the gross domestic product of the US, in real
terms.
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Table 2: Evolution of US real GDP
2000 11,325
2001 11,370 0.40%
2002 11,591 1.94%
2003 12,039 3.87%
2004 12,387 2.90%
2005 12,736 2.81%
2006 13,038 2.38%
2007 13,326 2.21%
2008 12,884 -3.32%
2009 12,873 -0.08%
2010 13,181 2.39%
2011 13,441 1.97%
2012 13,657 1.61%
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St Louis Website.
Several experts voiced their opinions regarding the causes of such a major downturn in the economy.
These opinions were sometimes conflicting and, most of the time, tended to blame the big institutions
and the insiders for their greed. Few of the explanations focused on the real bubble concept, which is
the purchase of an asset based on the false expectations of price appreciation and in the expectation to
sell in the future. This thesis will present evidence suggesting that the bubble dynamic was the key
driver of the recent crisis, instead of any other reason.
Paul Krugman (20) pointed out that the overall speculation on the rising housing prices and also the
financial innovation were responsible for fueling the bubble. The new structure of derivative products
such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and Mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) were, according
to him, too difficult to properly price and gave the wrong incentives to the market participants.
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Furthermore, Krugman added that the new low standards of credit were also a key factor that made
many of the loans either impossible or at least improbable to be properly repaid.
The figure below shows the prices in different cities of the US. It is possible to notice that home price
variations were sharply different in the three regions quoted, with Florida presenting the largest
variation. That variation is arguably difficult to explain by any "market-wide" argument such as the ones
proposed by Krugman. If the financial innovations were to blame, they should be present in all states. If
the incorrect standards of loans were to blame, they could also be expected in the entire country. In this
sense, the concept of bubble as defined in this thesis seems to better explain these events.
Figure 4: Real Estate prices evolution in different cities
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As new buyers were expecting price increases on the houses, based on past increases and also on the
profits that other investors had experienced, these investors entered into the housing market on false
expectations of increasing prices and with expectation of selling in the future. In that sense, the market
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as whole took a bet on housing prices. Based on that assumption, it is easy to justify a concentration in
Florida. In Florida, because of good weather and other attractive conditions, houses hold for speculative
reasons could serve a secondary function of a vacation home. That suggests the explanation why Florida
became a favorite destination of real estate "bets" from the market players. This behavior would be
similar to the one displayed during the Great Depression, in which Miami was a key place for the
speculation, as discussed previously. In other words, Florida real estate can be considered as high Beta
real estate, since there is a tendency for prices to go up fasters than average in the upturns and also to
go down faster than the average in the downturns.
Christopher L. Foote and Paul S. Willen (21) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston support this
theory. According to them the actual level of mortgage innovation during the 10 years preceding the
crisis was relatively small. Another fact that they present is that the "insiders" of the industry were
among the players that were hit the hardest, with big banks such as Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers
failing during the crisis. The table below presents the net risk exposure for some types of market
participants:
Table 3: Exposure of Financial Institutions to Housing Risk on the Eve of the Crisis ($ Billions)
Entity Loans HELOC Agency Non-Agency CDOs Residential Total
+2nds MBS AAAs (resi. subs) subs Exposure
US banks/Thrifts 2,020 869 852 383 90 0 4,212
GSEs/FHLB 444 0 741 308 0 0 1,493
Broker/Dealers 0 0 49 100 130 24 303
REITs 0 0 82 10 0 0 92
Hedge Funds 0 0 50 51 0 24 126
Money Managers 0 0 494 225 0 24 743
Insurance Cos. 0 0 856 125 65 24 1,070
Overseas 0 0 689 413 45 24 1,172
Financial Guarantors 0 62 0 0 100 0 162
Others 461 185 550 21 45 0 1,262
Total 2,925 1,116 4,362 1,636 476 121 10,680
Source: Figure 4 from "Residential Credit Losses-Going into Extra Innings?" Lehman Brothers U.S.
Securitized Products, April 11, 2008 and, as quoted in Christopher L. Foote and Paul S. Willen (21)
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Furthermore Foote and Willen, argue that players, particularly the banks, including the ones that failed,
were well aware of the risks they were taking. They had the clear understanding that several of the
products traded on the market, such as the CDO's, MBS's and the double CDO's had a strong sensitivity
to housing prices. In another words, they knew they were betting on housing prices. The table below
exemplifies this:
Table 4: Lehman Brothers HEL Bond Conditional Forecasts of Losses on Subprime Investments
Name Scenario Probability Cum Loss
(1) Aggressive 11% HPA over the life of the pool 15% 1.4%
(2) 8% HPA for life 15% 3.2%
(3) Base HPA slows to 5% by end-2005 50% 5.6%
(4) Pessimistic 0% HPA for the next 3 years 5% thereafter 15% 11.1%
(5) Meltdown -5% for the next 3 years, 5% thereafter 5% 17.1%
Source: "HEL Bond Profile across HPA Scenarios" from Lehman Brothers: "U.S. ABS Weekly Outlook,"
August 15, 2005, as quoted by Christopher L. Foote and Paul S. Willen (21)
The previous table presents some noteworthy facts. First, it comes from Lehman Brothers research
department and Lehman Brother is one of the banks that endured the most losses during the crisis. The
table presents a selection of housing price variations that ranged from 11% yearly increase to -5% yearly
variations for three years and then 5% increase thereafter. Most scenarios implied growth in the real
estate prices, despite their already high levels in 2005. Furthermore the table clearly presents the
probabilities of the scenarios and it indicates that reductions in prices were considered to be only 5%
likely to occur. Furthermore, Lehman Brother's research department was well aware of the severity of
the losses that would be incurred if the prices actually went down, since expected losses would more
than triple compared to the base scenario. In sum this table provides evidence, that at least for this
particular market participant, the risks were known, but the expectations were of an upward trend in
prices, exactly as it happens in a bubble environment.
The components of Mink Model present in this event:
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Shock: The belief that the last crisis (Internet Bubble) was not particularly strong combined with the
low interest rate environment made the market participants reassess their price forecasts for real
estate.
Speculation: Most market participants, including banks, broker-dealers and also families were bullish
on the future of housing prices, leading to an increase in exposure to real estate assets.
Fueling Credit: A large fraction of all real estate, the underlying asset of the crisis, was financed by
mortgages. These mortgages were issued with low down-payments and high leverage.
Crash event: Panic ensued after Lehman Brothers failed.
2.3.7 Overview of the selected bubbles
Several of the crises discussed present different variations of the same key elements: the shock, the
speculative run, the fueling credit and finally, the burst. The next table presents an overview of the
selected crisis.
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Table 5: Overview of the selected Bubbles
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Source: Thesis writer compilation
The next section of this thesis will focus on using these key elements and other inputs from the theory
to build a model to forecast bubbles. It is not possible to precisely predict a bubble, but instead the goal
of the next section will be to assess which asset class, if any, in the US markets presents the elements
that make it susceptible to bubble type of events.
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3 Framework to search for bubbles "ex-ante"
3.1 Disclaimer on bubble searching
To search for a bubble before it bursts is a very controversial proposition. Firstly, by definition, the
market "believes" intensely in the prices of the securities they are trading during the expansion phase of
the cycle. This trust and belief can by observed by the trading activity and the value of the long positions
that multiple market participants establish. These positions effectively expose these participants both to
the upsides, and to the downsides, demonstrating their bullishness on the underlying asset.
According to Reinhart et al, this is the "This time is different" mindset of the market players that impair
their abilities to envision the limits of growth and the risks of the investments. Furthermore, some of the
market players are expecting only short-term gains. As discussed before, the means and the end are
reversed in this situation. Thus, many current players have a strong incentive to push market prices up.
In order for that to happen, there is a need for fresh new buyers or, as described by Kindleberger, for
"Greater fools". This brings a great incentive for the current market participants to forecast even further
increases in prices. Not because they truly believe in that, but instead because they need the "Greater
fool" to show up.
Probably one of the best examples of how it is difficult to spot bubbles "ex-ante" can be found in the
tech bubble prediction made by Alan Greenspan. As chairman of the Federal Reserve, Greenspan had
significant resources, both in terms of data and analysis capability. All of these resources combined with
his experience led to the famous "Rational Exuberance" speech in 1996 (1). Even though this speech
clearly indicated his concern about the overvaluation of the stock market, or in the framework
presented in this thesis, the expansion phase of the cycle, the market seems to have ignored his
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warning. Since the day of the speech, December 5, 1996 to the peak of the NASDAQ index on March 10,
2000, the NASDAQ increased from 1300 points to 5048, or a 388% increase, to then burst to lower levels
that have not recovered since (at least until the time of the writing of this theses).
As a consequence of these factors and the historical evidence, there is a strong expectation that any
kind of bubble prediction that this research leads to (as well as any other, regardless of how well posed)
will face strong opposition, particularly from the current participants of the affected market.
3.2 Economic vs finance models as tools
The previous sections started to state about how difficult it might be to search for a bubble before it
burst, since there are many forecast variables that are subjective and necessary to determine the value
of a security. It deserves a further regard about an explanation about an important distinction between
"Economic" models such as the Hyman Mink model discussed previously and "Finance" models such as
the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The financial models are intensely focused on risk and on the principle
of no arbitrage. They are often based on the mechanic that similar securities should be similarly priced
and, if and when they are not, an arbitrageur can initiate a trade that will profit from this situation and
at the same time close the gap. On the other hand the "Economic" models in general are based on the
assumption that the risk-free rate is the greater guide of the economy and behavior of economic agents.
The assumption of the Economic models is that lower interest rates will foster investment and risk
taking by the economic agents and that will influence the economy in a cyclical way. The Hyman Minsk
model that will play a key role in the forecasting of bubbles has deeply embedded assumptions about
risk-free rate as a key driver to start a cycle. Finance models, on the other hand, such as the well-know
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CAPM offer an explanation that the willingness for individuals to invest might be inversely proportional
to the sum of the risk-free plus a risk premium. And this sum might not change with perfect correlation
with risk-free rates. Rather the opposite, in some situations, as in which there is an increase in risk
aversion, investors might demand higher returns for risky investments, even if the risk-free rate
decreases. Another important distinction is that finance models have risk in their core. The most
important variable is risk and the pricing of risk, and all prices are properly adjusted for the risks
embedded.
Economic models are useful to understand business cycles and to get information about the potential
bubble formation. Finance models present a great edge to understand the best way to protect an
investor once a bubble has been spotted. The nature of risk sharing and non-arbitrage implicit in the
finance models will be useful in the next section, to help build defensive strategies for prudent investors
to avoid some of the negative effects of bubbles.
3.3 Bubble "Score" strategy
This bubble searching approach is inspired by the Credit Score strategies. In such strategies, companies
such as Experian or Equifax start by gathering a pool of information from a given person or company and
with that information these companies create a score to predict the ability and the willingness of a given
individual or company to re-pay a loan.
These strategies analyze a large pool of data from past loans, both successful and also defaulted loans,
as well as information from the borrowers at the time of the issuance of the loans. Based on regression
and other statistical analyses of such loans, these strategies identify key factors that make a borrower
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more likely to be a good payer and which ones make him less likely to do so. After that, these multiple
factors are combined to determine a "credit" score that embeds all the information, both the positive
and also negative.
Similarly, the proposed Bubble "Score" strategy will try to search for bubbles in the US economy by
combining qualitative and quantitative information regarding the financial cycle that leads to a bubble.
The framework presented in the former sections of this thesis, permits the identification of some key
factors that are frequently associated with bubbles, some factors that are somewhat frequently
associated with bubbles and other that are somewhat negatively correlated with the bubbles.
The process to determine this model will start by identifying the relevant factors and then will evolve to
assess the situation of each of these factors for each of the relevant asset classes in the US financial
markets. Finally the resulting information will be combined in a bubble score that will indicate the
likeliness of the existence of a bubble in a given asset class in the US.
3.3.1 Risk factors
1. Significant "change" in the industry - one of the key factors relates to the change in the
mindset. Some big and important change in a given industry or market must have happened in
order to temporarily justify new levels of valuation, above what would be expected with the
"regular" mindset. One example would be the "gain of productivity" that sparked the IT bubble
in 2000.
2. Prices increase - As discussed in the "Minsky Model" section, markets in the expansionary
phase of the cycle experiences price increases. Some of these increases are due to legitimate
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improvements in the efficiency of the industry and some of it due to the overtrading or the
change in the "goal" and "means" mindset. In either ways, it is necessary to have a price
increase in order to generate a proper expansion that would fuel a bubble. For the purpose of
this thesis, the metric "total return" will be used instead of prices. There is a tight relationship
between the two variables and total returns tend to be a variable more comparable among
different asset classes.
3. Prices above historical average - Price increase is an important factor, but also top record
prices constitute an important factor to properly identify a bubble. If the market had already
experienced some level of prices, then market participants might still have enough information
to properly assess risks and prices. It is only when the prices reaches new levels that it becomes
difficult to assess what is due to real increase in performance and what is due to "overtrading".
For the purpose of this thesis, the metric "total return" will be used instead of prices. Even
though the two variables are interconnected, total returns are easier to compare among
different timelines. For example, a given corporate bond issuance may only have a maturity of 5
years, and even during this 5 years the prices might change for different reasons, and it is hard
to compare this bond to a historical trend. However, the total returns of any given corporate
bond could be compared to other similar bonds, both in the current markets, and also in terms
of historical returns.
4. Volume increase -The behavioral dynamic of investing in an asset class because of its recent
increases in price is an important factor in the bubble dynamic. Inexperienced buyers often join
a market due to the previous success histories of other players. These players often search for
short-term gains with little knowledge of the market and the risks associated. Furthermore,
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professional money managers also tend to increase exposures to upward trending markets
further boosting trading volume.
5. Low interest rates - As discussed in the Minsky model, low interest rates is an important
component of any speculation or mania. Many players get less "risk averse" when the cost of
borrowing is lower. The low interest rate could be for the entire market or for one specific asset
class such as for margin accounts or mortgages.
6. High leverage - As it was pointed out in the Minsky model, during the expansion phase of the
cycle, the existence of leverage increases significantly the likeliness of overshooting the prices.
As it happened in the Florida speculation run in the 1920's, or in the Tulip Mania in Amsterdam,
the payment of an upfront down payment was important in stimulating a higher risk-taking
behavior, particularly for the market participants who were interested in short-term gains and
not in the real cash flow streams from the underlying assets.
7. FED chairman warning -Another important factor is the evaluation of the market
characteristics by a very senior regulator, whose function demands him to make the necessary
efforts to make sure that the markets function properly. The "crash" that comes after a bubble
impairs the ability of the financial markets to function properly. Capital does not get allocated
properly, credit is halted, and of course the economy suffers some serious consequences. As a
result, the indications of overpricing in any market by the FED chairman should be considered as
one the risk factors.
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8. De-regulation - According to Reinhart et al., the reduction of regulation in the financial sector is
a factor commonly present in banking crises around the world. The change in the regulation
induces a change in the risk pattern of some of the investments and assets and these new risk
levels are, according to Reinhart et al, initially not fully comprehended by the market
participants. This situation leads to an overtrading bias that could fuel a bubble. Furthermore,
this could be also understood as a change in the industry as well (the first factor discussed).
3.3.2 Mitigating factors
1. More regulation - According to Reinhart et al. the increase in the regulation often have the
impact to limit the speculative runs on some of the key asset classes. If the increase in
regulation comes early enough it can avoid a bubble. In another cases, if the regulation arrives
too late, it could be the "trigger" factor to burst a bubble. The Japanese real estate bubble
exemplifies a situation in which the Bank of Japan regulation to limit the bank's growth of
mortgages has "stopped" the increase in real estate prices. This effectively triggered the bubble
burst. In either way, whether the increase in legislation prevents the bubble or bursts it, it is a
mitigating factor. In the situation that the legislation prevents the crisis it is clearly a mitigating
factor. In the situation it bursts the bubble, it makes a new bubble formation less likely in the
short term.
2. No or little leverage - the leverage factor is important part of the cycle. For the same reasons
that high leverage presents an important risk factor, the lack of leverage is a mitigating factor.
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With low leverage, usually the investors are better prepared to endure prices reductions and
this make them less likely to start a "fire sale" when prices drop. In turn, this combination
reduces the bubble risk.
3. Downward prices or recovery from a crisis - any asset class that is experiencing a long lasting
price reduction trend will probably not be a very attractive market for short-term investors.
Particularly the change in goal and means that defines the expansion phase of the cycle does
not take place in the downward price environment. If the asset is recovering from a crisis, then
these downward prices are even more pronounced and the protective effect is even stronger.
3.3.3 Combining the factors
The next step to complete the model is to determine the adequate weights to combine the factors and
create the bubble score model. This is a procedure that would be better achieved by using a regression
model and determining the weights that maximizes the ability of the model to properly map the risks of
bubble development, using the available data. However the data necessary to perform such
optimization is not available. The relevant bubbles in history are limited, occur in different types of
markets, which reduces data compatibility and, furthermore, many bubbles occurred in the distant past,
making data availability even lower. The strategy to be applied, instead, will focus on determining the
weights by a combination of two approaches. The first approach will be to analyze the importance that
the Minsk model gives to the factor and generate weights based this importance. The second approach
will be to analyze the presence of the mentioned factors in the small sample of bubbles discussed in the
section "Examples of financial bubbles". The final weight will be the combination of both approaches.
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Table 6: Calculation of the weights of the risk factors for the bubble score model
Significant change in
industry
Prices increase
Prices (or returns)
above historcal levels
Volume increase
Low interest rates
High leverage
Regulation level
Official warning
Very important
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
N/A
2
1 1
1
1 1
1
1
1 -
0 n / a
V.
Vt
V.
V.
V.
V.
V.
n/a
-
n / a
-
n .a
4..
4.9
V.
I
V.
V.
V.
V.
V.
V.
V.
V.
2 4
2 3
2 3
2 3
1 2
1 2
1 2
2 2
Source: Thesis writer analysis
The information regarding "Official Warning" is related to the warnings that Alan Greenspan, as the
president of the FED issued regarding some of the recent booming markets. Those were important
warnings, which if properly considered by any investor in his investment strategy, could have helped this
particular investor to protect himself from some of downturns following the bubble bursts.
This factor could be considered as not present in many or the earlier bubbles, however that would be to
misinterpret the nature of this warning. The level of knowledge and analysis capability that the FED now
commands is unparalleled in history. To compare the presence of an Official Warning in earlier manias,
such as the Tulip Mania, would be impossible, since simply there wasn't a comparable institution at the
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time. Even for the great depression in the US, the FED was then only a recently founded institution with
less than 20 years of history and far fewer capabilities than it now possesses. Therefore this factor was
considered to be unavailable for some of the earlier manias.
The table below presents the different levels or states in which the factors can be for a given security.
The table also presents the number of points that the asset class will gain by each level of the factor.
More points indicate a higher probability of a bubble behavior to be forming in the given asset class.
Table 7: Levels and weights of the factors in the predictive model
Significant change in
industry
Prices increase
Prices (or returns)
above historical levels
Volume increase
Low interest rates
High leverage
Regulation level
High official warning
Yes (4)
Yes (3)
Yes - more then 2x
Historical (3)
Yes (3)
Yes (2)
Yes (2)
Increase (-2)
Yes (2)
Source: Thesis writer analysis
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No (0)
No (0)
Yes (1.5)
No (0)
No (O)
No (O)
Same (0)
No (0)
No (0)
Reduced (2)
3.4 Timeframe
According to Lo (6), it is impossible to precisely determine the time that a crisis or a bubble will occur
and therefore it is not the goal of this thesis to precisely time the crisis. However, previous research
conducted on the subject might prove useful to provide a guideline on the time between bubbles.
The research conducted by Reinhart et al, helps to shed light on the frequency of the bubble
phenomena. This research collected data of a series of world data from different banking crisis in an
organized and statistically significant way. It is not exactly the same information as the number of
financial bubbles. Sometimes, as in the 1929 real estate bubble or in the 2008 real estate bubble, both
the bubble and the banking crisis can occur at the same time. In other situations, the bubble can occur
without the banking crisis, as it was the case in the Internet Bubble. Furthermore it is also possible to
have a banking crisis without a bubble, such as the long lasting Savings and Loans Crisis.
According to Bordo et al (22), banking crises tend to occur in synchrony with the boom and boost cycle
of real estate. This indicated that the frequency of banking crisis might be a potential indicator of the
expected frequency of boom and boost cycles in the economy.
The table below summarizes the frequency of banking crisis identified by Reinhart et al.
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Table 8: Frequency of Crises in selected developed countries
Share of
Number of years in Number of Mean Time Mean Time
Banking Banking Banking between between
Crisis since Crisis since Crisis since crises (1800- crises (1945-
Country 1800 1800 (%) 1945 now) (years) now) (years)
France
USA
UK
Italy
Germany
Spain
Japan
Sweden
Average
15
13
12
11
8
8
8
5
10
11.5
13.0
9.2
8.7
6.2
8.1
8.1
4.8
87
1
2
4
1
2
2
2
1
1.9
Source: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (3)
According to this information, one crisis occurs in the selected pool of countries every 21.9 years, in
average. This suggests that current markets in the US are relatively protected from bubbles in the short
term, since the last real estate bubble busted in 2008, or only 5 years ago. This statistics provide no
guarantees, but instead an indication.
Furthermore, data also suggests that in any given year, there is an 8.7% chance to experience a banking
crisis.
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12.6
14.3
16.1
17.7
25.0
24.5
24.5
40.6
21.9
66.0
32.0
15.0
66.0
32.0
32.0
32.0
66.0
42.6
3.5 Mathematical overview - JLS Model
The alternative bubble forecasting approach is based on Didier Sornette (23) (24) (25) suggested
mathematical model. The JLS (Johansen, Ledoit and Sornette) model is based on mathematical
assumptions regarding the individual traders in the market. It assumes that each trader's decision to buy
or sell any given security is influenced by two factors: the trader individual opinions and analysis of the
markets and the opinions of other traders he is related to. According to the JLS model, all traders in the
world are organized in a network, and each individual trader has only a few contacts with whom he or
she interacts. Each individual trader weights these two inputs, his own opinions and the opinion of the
traders of his or her network, differently to make his or her trading decision. His own opinion is
independent of other trader's opinions and fosters a diversity of opinions in the market. This diversity of
opinions leads to the existence of both buyers and sellers of the same security, or what Sornette calls
"disorder." The other factor which influences the trader's behavior is the opinion of other traders in his
network. This is a stimulus that tends to influence traders to have a uniform opinion, or what Sornette
calls "order" on the market. The JLS model is based on the conflict of these two factors. The crisis or the
crash occurs when order prevails and all traders take the same side, which tends to be the selling side.
Under this model, there is no need of any big event to "burst" a bubble, something that explains both
the 1929 crash and also the Internet Bubble, events that were not preceded by any particular bad news
in the market.
Sornette suggests that the tendency of traders to imitate their peers vary over time and is the key driver
of crashes. When the tendency of the trader to imitate other traders becomes sufficiently larger than his
tendency to follow his own opinions, it creates a mechanism of local coordination and traders start to
take the same position in the market. When the imitating tendency is even larger, this local coordination
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can grow, and a large number of traders, or the entire market, can become aligned. According to
Sornette, this happens during the crashes and is a behavior similar to some physical systems. Sornette
also suggests that one of the conclusions of the model is that prices should rise faster close to the crash
moment, since traders will need an additional compensation for the extra risk they are incurring.
The mathematical model is based on a stochastic dynamic of interacting particles, fairly common in the
fields of biology and physics. The key equation of the JLS model is presented below.
p(t) = A1 + B1 (tc - t)fl + C1 (tc - t)fl cos[o1 log(tc - t) + #]
Where:
p(t) is the price of the security
A1 , B1, C1,#1 are parameters
tcis the time of the expected crash
and &)is the frequency of the oscillations
The model can be used to forecast the time of upcoming crashes. In order to accomplish this goal, the
price equation has to be fitted to the price time series of a given security and the square errors
minimized. According to the proponents of the model, the lower the square error the higher the
likelihood that a crash will occur in the time forecasted by the model.
Yan (23) applies the JLS model to generate a crash indicator and a trading strategy. According to his
back-testing, the trading strategy generated with the JLS model can yield positive alpha, beyond any
statistical doubt, providing support for the model's ability to forecast crashes.
But the JLS model is not without controversy. Chang (26) argues that is it not possible to properly
validate the JLS model and other authors argue that the JLS model, even if based on sound financial and
mathematical foundation, is prone to implementation problems. One such problems is over fitting or
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data mining. Since the core of the model depends on the fitting of the JLS equation with the real prices,
there are different ways that such fitting could be done and the results of the model could be
misinterpreted as simple data mining. This argument is also supported by the number of degrees of
freedom in the model (a total of seven) and most importantly by the fact that the time window of the fit
is not determined by the theory. In this sense, data organized into hundreds of different time windows
could be selected and used as inputs to the model. After the model has generated its results, the best
performing time windows could be selected, generating an adverse selection bias. Therefore, it could be
difficult to distinguish between the real results of the model and the "selection bias" of the operator.
Given this criticism, the JLS model will be used only as support tool in this thesis.
4 Analysis of potential bubbles in the US
This section of this thesis will focus on assessing how the different asset classes in the US are exposed to
financial bubbles. The first step in this procedure is to determine the greater pool of assets to evaluate.
The overall market was selected based on two sources. The first was based on Antti limanen (27)
suggested key asset classes and the second was based on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (28)
reported key consumer debt types. The combination of these two sources was considered to be the
overall market to be analyzed, in order to determine which assets classes should be scored by the new
bubble score model.
One of the characteristics that an asset class must possess in order to be relevant for this bubble study is
to present a significant market capitalization. Asset classes with small market capitalization are on
average a small share of the overall investor's portfolio, therefore their relative underperformance does
not tend to negatively impact an investor's portfolio in a meaningful way. The second characteristic that
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an asset class must present is liquidity. The definition of bubble discussed previously implies that
markets are valuing an asset improperly to obtain short-term goals. However, if any given asset does not
possess a strong secondary market, it becomes hard, if not impossible, for an investor to establish a
short-term trading position.
The table below presents the overall asset classes analyzed and the selected asset classes based on the
two desirable characteristics discussed.
Table 9: Asset classes selection
Tech
Stocks Financials
All Stocks
Treasuries
Mortgages
Alternatives Hedge Funds
Private Equity
REIT's
Venture Capital
Subtotal Alternatives
Money Markets
Other Credit Student Loans
Auto Loans
Credit Card
Other
Subtotal consumer
credit
3,456 Yes
4,235 Yes
16,856 Yes
2,889 Yes
7,348 Yes
1,331 Yes
11,568 Yes
9,088 Yes
3,714
24,370
12,949
2,130
2,000
603
199
2,802
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
S&P 500 Sector index
S&P 500 Sector index
Russell 3000 components
Low liquidity
Low liquidity
Low market cap
Low liquidity and low
market cap
Recent government
2,461 No guarantee
Low liquidity/
Concentration of
966 No government ownership
783 No Low market cap
679 No Low market cap
351 No Low market cap
S&P(1)
S&P (1)
S&P (1)
Department of Treasury -
Office of Debt Management
(1)
SIFMA (1)
SIFMA (1)
Federal Reserve ZI Report -
table L2 (1)
Hedge Fund research Inc,
as quoted by the WSJ (1)
TheCityUK (1)
SIFMA (1)
National Venture Capital
Association (1)
SIFMA (1)
FRBNY (1)
FRBNY (1)
FRBNY (1)
Federal Reserve ZI Report -
table L2 (1)
2,779
Total Market Capitalization of Analyzed Assets 62,217
Total Market Capitalization of Selected Assets 54,175 871%
( Sources of information further detailed in the next table.
The next table provides an overview of the sources of the information present in Table 9.
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rnM-r
Up to 1 Y
> 1 and < 10 Years
>= 10 Years
Sub Total
Investment Grade
High Yield
Bonds
Corporate
Municipals
Subtotal Bonds
Table 10: Sources of information for Table 9
Tech
Stocks Finantials
All Stocks
Treasuries
Bonds
Coorporate
Municipals
Subtotal Bonds
Mortgages
Alternatives Hedge Funds
Private Equity
REIT's
Venture Capital
Subtotal Alternatives
Money Markets
Other Credit Student Loans
Auto Loans
Credit Card
Other
Subtotal Consumer
credit
loomberg, using S&P IT Index
Bloomberg, using S&P Finantials Index
Bloomberg, using Russell 3000 index
Department of Treasury - Office of Debt Management Quartely report.
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/quarterly-
refunding/Documents/TBACDiscussionChartsFeb_2013.pdf
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Statistical Data on Bonds
Outstanding http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx
Federal Reserve Z1 Report - table L2
Hedge Fund research Inc, as quoted by the WSJ
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304331204577354043852093400.html
?mg=id-wsj)
TheCityUK Research Centre: Financial Market Series - Private Equity July 2012
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Statistical Data on Bonds
National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 2013
(http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=257&ltemid=1
03)
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Statistical Data on Bonds
Outstanding http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx
Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, February 2013, Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, Research and Statistics Group
Federal Reserve Z1 Report - table L2 (1)
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Once the starting pool of assets is selected as presented in Table 9, the next step is to actually analyze
these asset classes using the Bubble Score model, which will be done in section 4.2. Before, however,
the next session will briefly discuss the asset classes that were not selected to be scored with the new
bubble score model.
4.1 Remarks about the asset classes not scored with the Bubble
Score model
Some of the asset classes from the starting pool of asset classes were not selected to be scored with the
bubble scoring model, based on two criteria. These asset classes account for only 13% of the market
capitalization of the original pool of asset classes and they either did not provide a significant market
capitalization or did not prove to be liquid instruments. Before moving to the next section that
effectively scores the asset classes, this thesis will briefly discuss the asset classes that were not
selected.
The largest of the non-selected asset classes was the Money Markets Funds with $ 2.5 T of assets under
management. These are funds that play a role in the asset allocation for short-term investments. A
traditional money market fund owns different short-term obligations (such as Commercial Paper) from
different issuers, always with short duration and maturity. In the recent US financial crisis, money
markets suffered a severe downturn as some of their liquid assets began to default. As a consequence,
the owners of these fund's shares not only lost some of their money, but also lost liquidity, since it could
take years to get recovery from the defaulted instruments. However, this asset class was promptly
supported by the government. The quote below from a news agency at the time (29) exemplifies this
support:
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Sept. 19 2008 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. will insure money-market funds against
losses for the next year as it seeks to prevent a run on $3.35 trillion of assets that
average investors and institutions rely on as a safe alternative to bank deposits.
Bloomberg news service (29)
If these funds suffer another strong downturn, it is possible to expect the government once again to
step in to support the industry. As a consequence, this asset class is not prone to developing bubble
behavior. The second largest asset class that was not selected was the Hedge Funds with $ 2.1 T of
assets under management. These funds have grown in volume in the last years and tend to have a
diversified pool of strategies of investments. One of the characteristics of these funds is that investors
are usually qualified, sophisticated and well aware of the risks incurred in the investment. Another key
point that makes Hedge Funds less prone to the formation of bubbles is their low liquidity. Many funds
have a lock-up period and the assets under management cannot be withdrawn on short notice. In this
sense the bubble behavior is not stimulated. The same occurs for the third largest asset class that was
not selected - the Private Equity Funds with $ 2.0 T of AUM. These funds tend to have an even longer
lock-up period, sometimes ranging from 5-10 years and investors have little liquidity during this period.
As a consequence the short-term bubble behavior is avoided.
The other asset classes not selected each have a market capitalization of less than $ 1.0 T.
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4.2 Results of the Bubble Score model
The first analysis will focus on the total return evolution. An asset class will be marked with a bubble flag
if it presents a constantly increasing total return for the three years considered. The time frame of three
years was selected since the bubble dynamic is intrinsically short termed. Particularly according to
Carroll's framework and also Lo's hypothesis of adaptive markets, investors will become less risk averse
once they realize that other investors are profiting from a given market. This will be mapped as the
three year's returns.
Table 11: Return Evolution Analysis
Total Return of assets (% yearly)
Growing Total
Returns
Asset Class Sucas Subclass 2 200201202 bubble flag ?
Tech 10.09% 2.48% 14.72%
Stocks Financials 12.06% -16.91% 28.68%
All Stocks 16.65% 1.01% 16.29%
Up to 1 Y 0.11% 0.07% 0.03%
. > 1 and < 10 Years 4.70% 6.46% 1.50%
>= 10 Years 14.68% 22.69% 2.83%
Sub Total
Bonds Investment Grade 9.20% 9.53% 10.37%
Corporate High Yield 11.26% 6.53% 11.20%
Municipals 4.29% 4.59% 4.29%
Subtotal
Mortgages 5.50% 3.29% 4.39%
Sources of information: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters.
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The results presented in the previous Table indicate that none of the asset classes analyzed presented a
constantly growing total return over the three years period and therefore none of them were marked to
have a total return flag.
The next table presents the comparison of the total returns of the last three versus the average of the
historical long-term total returns. An above historical flag will be marked for any asset class that
presents either three years above the historical total returns or at least one year of returns that exceeds
the historical levels by 200 basis points
Table 12: Returns vs. Historical Returns Analysis
Return on the year -Historicai Return(
Abov Historica
Asset Cls Su cls 201 201 2012 fl ?
Tech 10.58% -0.49% -&10% 4.14%
Stocks Financials 6.50% 5.56% -23.41% 22.18%
All Stocks 7.08% 9.57% -6.07% 9.21%
Up to 1 Y 4.43% -4.31% -4.35% -440%
. > 1 and < 10 Years 6.68% -1.97% -0.22% -5.18% 4
>= 10 Years 8.10% 6.58% 14.59% -5.27%
Bonds Sub Total
Investment Grade 7.00% 2.20% 2.53% 3.37%
Corporate High Yield 8.70% 2.56% -2.17% 2.50%
Municipals 5.24% -0.95% -0.65% -0.95%
Subtotal
Mortgages 7.10% -1.60% -3.81% -2.71%
Sources of information: Bloomberg (realized returns), Thomson Reuters (realized returns), Antti Ilmanen (27)
(historical returns).
The results presented in the previous Table indicate that Financial Stocks, Long maturity Treasury Bonds
and Corporate Bonds were marked to have a total return flag.
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The next table assesses the evolution of the outstanding value of the assets classes. An asset class will
be considered with a flag bubble if it consistently grew in total market capitalization in the last three
years.
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Table 13: Volume evolution Table
Market Capital ization (USD B) Market Capitalization Growth
Fa Volume
2009 2010 2011 2012 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011 202 evolution
UAsset Class , LSbdass 2
Tech 2,974.7 3,123.7 3,100.6 3,456.0 149.0 (23.1) 355.4
Stocks Financials 3,579.4 4,082.1 3,619.2 4,235.0 502.7 (462.9) 615.8
All Stocks 14,877.0 15,916.1 15,977.3 16,855.6 1,039.1 61.2 878.4
Up to 1 Y 2,702 2,563 2,620 2,889 (139) 57 269
Treasuries > 1 and < 10 Years 4,385 5,946 6,791 7,348 1,561 846 557
>= 10 Years 695 853 1,017 1,331 158 164 314
Bonds Sub Total 7781.9 9361.5 10428.3 11568 1579.6 1066.8 1139.7
Corporate Investment Grade 7,089 8,016 8,325 9,088 927 309 763High Yield
Municipals 3,673 3,772 3,719 3,714 100 (53) (5)
Subtotal 15,821 17,938 19,363 24,370 2,118 1,425 5,007
Mortgages 14,179 13,558 13,221 12,949 (621) (337) (272) 4
Sources of information: see Table 10
The last table indicated that several asset classes presented growth flags.
The next table combines the results of the three last tables and also adds the additional bubble factors to finally complete the bubble score for
the selected asset classes.
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Table 14: Overall Bubble risk Factors
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This last table presented the combined results of the bubble Score strategy. The flags were combined with the weights discussed previously and
each asset class was assigned a total number of points or score. The scores varied from a low of -2 to a maximum of 6. The lower numbers
indicate asset classes in situations that are not likely to develop bubbles and the higher scores indicate situations in which the bubble
development is more likely. The two asset classes that had the highest bubble score were: Longer Maturity Treasury bonds and also Corporate
Bonds. The next section will discuss these instruments in more detail.
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Results of the JLS Model
As mentioned in Section 3.5, the JLS model was only applied as a supporting model, given the criticisms
that it faces regarding data mining issues. Particularly the model was applied to the equity asset classes
discussed in the previous sub-section to determine if there is a prediction of a crash in the near future.
Even though the model could be properly adjusted to analyze other types of asset classes (such as
bonds), those adjustments were beyond the scope of this research. The next figure present the price
series used as inputs to the model.
Figure 5: Index levels used on the JLS model
Source: Standard and Poor's
The next table presents the outputs of the model, as well as the square error of the fit.
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4.3
Table 15: JLS Model results
S&P 500 Index (^SPX) - Index 3/28/2007 3/13/2013
Value
S&P 500 Sector Indices -
Financials Sector index - Index 3/28/2007 3113/2013
Value
S&P 500 Sector Indices -
Information Technology Sector 3/28/2007 3/13/2013
Index - Index Value
DJIA 2/21/1923 2/19/1929
Source: Thesis writer analysis
1500
1500
1500
1500
3/6/2016 12.2%
5/18W2018 25.4%
3/14/2016 13.0%
6/5/1931 6.8%
I-
0.57 Low fit (RA2 and Error
square)
Low it (RA2 and Error
0.58 square)
Low fit (RA2 and Error0.63 square)
0.96 Used to ont the ellclency
of the model
According to table (Table 15), the S&P indexes that were added to the model presented crash dates in
the year of 2016. However, the fit that the modeled prices had with real data was low. The average
error in the fit ranged from 12.2% to 25.4% and the RA2 ranged from 0.57 to 0.68. To give a reference,
when the famous 1929 crash data was inputted in the JLS model, the crash time was predicted to be
6/5/1931 with a comparative higher fit. The average error was just 6.8% and the RA2 was 0.96. Hence, it
is possible to conclude that the fits that the model obtained for the current S&P indexes were not able
to yield a reliable bubble forecast. As a consequence, the interpretation of the JLS model is that either
there is no expected bubble or, at least, the model is unable to forecast it.
4.4 Remarks about U.S . Treasury bonds
The United States of America Treasury bonds and bills are some of the most important instruments in
the global financial markets. These instruments are not only important due to their significant market
capitalization ($ 11.5 T), but also due to their importance in determining the risk-free rate. The risk-free
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rate is an important input of many of the financial models that are used to price other assets. Examples
of models that use the risk-free rate are the Black and Scholes model to price options and the Capital
Asset Pricing Model used to price stocks and other assets. Given the relevance of the Treasury Bonds,
this section of the thesis will focus particularly on them.
The Treasury Bonds are widely believed - or said to be - risk-free instruments. But are they really risk
free? To answer this question it is necessary to fully assess the riskiness of such instruments. Basically,
there are two risks that threaten the value of a Treasury bond. The first one is the risk that, once one
investor has bought the bond, the issuer, or the government, may fail to repay the coupons or the
principal on the due date. That is the default risk. The second risk is related to the secondary market.
The investor might decide to sell the bond before its maturity in the secondary market. In this situation,
the price of the instrument might be lower than the price the investor would expect to receive,
considering the "curve" of the bond. That is the market risk of the bond.
4.4.1 Market Risk
The usual assumption that Treasury Bonds are risk free only concerns the government obligations and
does not state anything about the secondary market. In that sense, these bonds are freely traded in the
market and their secondary prices can and do change. This volatility leads to the market risk.
The following curve shows the evolution of the 30-Year Treasury Yield.
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Figure 6: Evolution of newly issued 30 Year Treasuries Yields
30 Year Treasury Yield (%)
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Sources of information: Bloomberg.
The downward trend in the yield is noteworthy. This trend is demonstrated by the regression line that
indicates that as each year passes, in the time frame from 1990 to 2013, the 30 Year Treasury yield
reduced by 0.208% or 21 bps.
That is a significant and important variation in prices. The total return an investor will receive from
holding a Treasury bond will be (assuming that the holding period is short compared to the duration of
the bond):
Total Return = ydt - Ddy + Coa2 dt
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where
y = bond yield
P = price
D= Duration
C = Convexity
a = yield volatility
Where D is the duration of the bond (assumed to be 19.5 years for the 30 years Bond) and for simplicity
we can assume the coupon is equal to the yield.
This means that the more the interest rates fall, the better the bond performs relative to its coupon,
since the resale market price becomes higher. The downward trend in the yields implies that the real
returns the investors got from holding the 30 Year bonds were far higher than the coupons on the years
from 1990 to 2013.
Using this framework, we could determine the total returns for holding 30 Year treasuries for the noted
period and split the return in the two components - the Coupon Yield and the Duration effect. The
graph below illustrates these results and the importance of the Duration effect.
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Figure 7: Decomposition of 30 Year treasuries returns in Coupon and "Duration" effect
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if an investor had the strategy to buy recently issued 30Y treasuries and resell them after one year,
buying a new one afterwards, of each 100 USD that this investor would have made 53 would have come
from actual coupons and another 47 would have come from capital gains in the resale of the bond.
This situation can only happen when the yields are reducing, and that is definitely something that
cannot happen indefinitely. Zero is the minimum yield possible for the bond. Below this value, investors
would simply hold their cash and not invest.
Perhaps one of the best indicators of the future path of this market is contained in the speech given by
the FED Chairman Ben Bernanke on March 1 't 2013 (30). According to him, the market should expect to
see the 30 Years Treasuries trading at "4 or 5% yield in 2017". But what are the implications of these
77
changes for a current holder of a recently issued 30 years Treasury? Some simplifying assumptions can
help in the calculation of this change:
Assumptions:
* 30 Y treasuries and 26 Y treasuries trade at the same YTM, or in other words, the yield curve is
flat after the 26 years maturity
e Current Yield is 3.26%
* Yield of 30 Year and 26 Year Treasury Bonds in 2017 will be 5% (according to Chairman
Bernanke's estimation)
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Figure 8: Calculation of 30 Year Treasuries returns implied by Chairman Bernanke's forecasts
Current Price
3.00% Coupon
3.26% Yield Cash flow analysis
30.00 Time to maturity (years
$ 95.11 Price/ each USD 100face value
Coupns in the next four years
8 Number of coupons
$ 1.50 Nomial value/ each USD 100 face value
Future Price
3.00% Coupon
5.00% Yield
26.00 Time to maturity (years
Year Cash flow
0 $ (95.11)
0.5 $ 1.50
1 $ 1.50
1.5 $ 1.50
2 $ 1.50
2.5 $ 1.50
3 $ 1.50
3.5 $ 1.50
4 $ 72.96
-1.72%
Description
Purchase of
bond
Coupons
Coupons
Coupons
Coupons
Coupons
Coupons
Coupons
Coupn +
Market value
of Bond
IRR
$ 71.46 Price / each USD 100 face value
Source: Thesis writer calculation
This is a relatively alarming result. If these assumptions are correct, and Chairman Bernanke's
expectations of the evolution of yields of the Treasury Bonds prove to be correct, then owning a 30 Y
treasury bond will be a negatively yielding investment for the next 4 years, with its internal rate of
return estimated to be -1.7% yearly.
The recent speeches from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Vice Chairman Janet Yellen (31)
provide support for this theory. According to her proposed "optimal control path", short-term interest
rates should remain very low until 2016 and then should experience a steep increase.
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4.4.2 Default Risk
The other component of the risk incurred by holding a bond is the default risk. In this sense, the United
States Treasury Bonds are considered risk free.
This is truly a very strong assessment and this thesis will do little to counter this assumption, but will
only mention that the current CDS spread for the US Treasury obligations is 20bps (source: Bloomberg),
which is a very small number, implying that great assurance in the ability of US to handle all of its budget
related issues.
4.4.3 The uncertain nature of bubble prediction
There are many indications based on the bubble score model that suggest that the long maturity
treasury bonds are prone to a bubble type of behavior. On the other hand one factor that plays a key
importance is Chairman Bernanke's forecast about the future yields. This forecast is important to
determine the total returns expected in the next 4 years for this bonds. However, the assumption that
Chairman Bernanke presents is that it the current spot yield curve is not precisely pricing the expected
changes in interest rates in the next four years and therefore the yield curve will change significantly.
This, by definition is a type of speculation. There is no trade that could be performed with this
information that would generate risk-free returns in any state. For one reason, Bernanke's prediction
could be wrong. Even if he has a large pool of resources and a lot of experience, the prediction could still
be wrong. Some bad event could happen in Europe, or in any other place, and that could make the
markets move unexpectedly to safer assets pushing yield to different directions. On the other hands
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budget discussions in the US congress could evolve in ways that could make it difficult for the US
treasury department to serve its debt properly, pushing treasuries to yields to higher prices than the
ones predicted by Bernanke. That being said, any bubble forecast will involve some type of assumption
or speculation about a parameter that the market is not pricing correctly, and probably Bernanke is in a
privileged position to make such a prediction, given his experience and the FED analytical research
resources.
4.5 Remarks about corporate bonds
Corporate bonds constitute the second asset class that got the highest number of points under the
suggested bubble score model. These Bonds got the score based on two important parameters: real
returns above historical average and growth in the market capitalization of the assets. Those two topics
will be further assessed for the corporate bonds.
The growth of the total value of bonds outstanding might both indicate a hazard situation, in which
overtrading is leading to an unsustainable situation, such as the one experienced on the internet bubble,
or it could also indicate that the corporations are experiencing real growth and the bonds are supporting
this growth. To better distinguish these two situations, it is useful to analyze the growth the in the
corporation's balance sheets. The graph below presents the information regarding the growth of
corporate balance sheets, both in terms of assets and also in terms of revenues.
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Figure 9: Evolution of Assets of US Corporations
Source: FRED - Federal Reserve Economic Data - FED of Saint Louis.
Figure 10: Evolution of Profits of US Corporations
Source: FRED - Federal Reserve Economic Data - FED of Saint Louis.
It is possible to see in the previous figures that both corporate assets and also profits have grown
significantly in the recent years. The next table will present the comparison of the growth rates of
corporations' assets, profits and the value of outstanding corporate bonds.
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Table 16: Evolution of selected financial information for corporations
Financial Information 2009 2010 20121RGoh20
Bonds Outstanding ($ B) $ 7,089 $ 8,016 $ 8,325 $ 9,088 8.63%
Assets ($ B) $ 26,188 $ 28,037 $ 29,973 $ 31,619 6.48%
Profits ($ B) $ 4,685 $ 5,772 $ 5,900 12.23%
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Statistical Data on Bonds Outstanding,
Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis
Analyzing the growth of corporate bonds of 8.63% CAGR in the last three years it seems to be a large
number. However the growth in profits of 12.23% and the growth in assets of 6.48% suggest that the
corporations are increasing their balance-sheets and their profitability, and, hence, the increase in the
corporate bonds outstanding could be largely justified by this growth.
The second parameter that made the corporate bonds to score high in the bubble score strategy is the
fact that their recent total returns are higher than their average returns. In this sense, the corporate
bonds are sensible to the same factors discussed for the government bonds, with the difference that
corporate bonds tend to have a smaller duration, making them less volatile.
4.6 Remarks about other commonly mentioned potential bubbles
..Ever since the financial crisis, Americans have begun to see bubbles
everywhere they turn... (32)
Christopher Matthews, Reporter for TIME Business
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Often the mainstream and specialized media refer to the concept of "bubbles" in different ways. Mihir
Desai (33) argues that CEO's compensation is currently a topic that is fueling a bubble. The concept of
the "compensation bubble" is that there is a lack of accountability in the CEO compensation plans and
this leads to a reinforcing loop of increasing risks to corporations. Even if that is an important topic that
should deserve proper attention, this is not a truly financial bubble. Investors do not buy and sell CEO
"contracts", but instead investors buy and sell company securities. Hence, the "compensation bubble"
could directly affect the company securities (stocks and bonds), and those were previously analyzed and
scored using the financial bubble score model.
Another line of credit that is often regarded to be prone to bubble behavior (34) is student loans. Some
of the proponents of this possibility argue that the increasing leverage of the student loans combined
with the bad economy justify the expectation of the bubble.
Figure 11: Private Student Loans Gross Cumulative Defaulted Dollars curves by repayment entry
vintage by years of seasoning for five non-profit lenders (that account for 85% of the PSL universe)
Gross cumulative Losses by Repayment Vintage
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Source: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (35)
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However, student loans accounts for only 1.0 T $ or less than 2% of the overall market capitalization of
the pool of assets analyzed. Furthermore, 85% of the student loans (32) are backed by the federal
government. In that sense, these are not tradable instruments and cannot build fuel the speculation
mania, since they are priced considering the government guarantee.
5 Institutional alternatives to reduce the severity of bubbles
One of the objectives of this thesis is to suggest functional alternatives for informed and prudent
investors to avoid some of the worst consequences of bubbles. The previous sections discussed two
alternatives to search for bubbles ex-ante and this section will suggest some functional ways that
prudent investors could protect themselves from the worst consequences of bubbles.
These suggestions could be combined with the bubble identification strategies suggested in the previous
section of this thesis or with any other bubble identification approach, as long as the approach clearly
indicates the assets that are likely to develop a bubble.
One point that might be misinterpreted as a bubble control technique is market timing. According to
Henriksson and Merton (36), market timing is the strategy to identify the moment in which one
particular market will outperform another market. Market timing can be part of an important alpha
generating strategy. Market timing can be applied in all times, even in times in which bubble type of
events are not building up. On the other hand, the strategies that will be discussed for bubble control
are only applicable in situations in which there is a bubble building or, at least, a significant likelihood of
a bubble formation.
Two strategies are suggested that can be applied to make prudent investors prepared to bubbles. They
differ in the way they accomplish this goal. One alternative does depend on structural changes that
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require new legislation and or regulation and the other alternative does not require such changes. The
next subsection will discuss these alternatives, starting with the one that does not require new
legislation or regulation.
5.1 Investor-driven alternative - "Anti-bubble Fund Style"
This investor-driven alternative does not require the enacting of new legislation or regulation, but
instead relies on the individual investor's decision to avoid bubbles. This could be accomplished with an
"Anti-bubble" fund style. The investment management landscape today presents several alternatives for
investments. Investors can find both mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs) that track different
indexes and investment styles. To exemplify the diversity of ETFs available, Black Rock, one of the
leading providers in ETFs, alone offers 281 different ETFs for its investors. One particular type of fund
style is the socially responsible investing fund style (37). This style aims to invest in companies with
"positive environmental, social and governance ("ESG") characteristics relative to their industry and
sector peers." Similarly it is possible to create an anti-bubble or counter-cyclical fund style that would
aim to invest in strategies that avoid the assets prone to bubble behavior.
This new style would basically use any reasonable source of bubble behavior prediction such as either of
the two discussed in this thesis (Bubble Score or JLS model) or any other, and apply this information to
conduct the investment asset allocation. This new style could achieve this goal in different ways. It
could significantly underweight any asset class that is prone to bubble behavior or else it could hold the
asset classes known to be risky, but also buy some downside protection. In this way, investors in this
fund could still benefit from some of the upside during the fueling period of the bubble, and still have a
protection when and if the bubble event occurs. Simply just not holding the risk asset seems to be the
safer option, but on the other hand, it is also the option that might forgo the upsides completely and
face stronger opposition from the opponents of the concept of bubble, such as the ones mentioned in
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section 2.1. Bubble predictions are far from perfect and for any given asset class considered likely to
develop a bubble, the bubble could take years to develop or maybe not develop at all. Therefore it is
probably better to implement the anti-bubble style with the strategy to underweight the bubble-prone
asset class or with the strategy to buy downside protection for that asset class. These two alternatives
will provide protection and still preserve some of the upside returns from the given asset classes.
The pillar of the anti-bubble fund style would be an anti-bubble base index. This base index would be
the target for the asset managers who would implement this strategy. The composition of this index
should start with the broadest array of assets, including Stocks, Bonds and Mortgages, similar to the
approach presented in Table 9. These assets should be weighted based on their market capitalization to
mimic the broadest type of market possible. After this step is completed, some type of bubble-searching
test should be applied periodically, either one of the two suggested in this thesis, or any other that is
regarded as able to spot bubbles. The asset classes that are ranked high or that presented a high
probability of developing a bubble should have their weights reduced by a multiple in this index or some
protective options should be added to the index.
Once the index is properly developed, the individual asset managers could launch funds aiming to follow
this index. This style would give a positive incentive for the money managers: they would not try to
"dance the dance" on the bubbling markets and, instead, they would try to track and beat the index by
mimicking its composition. In that sense, investors would get their expectations aligned with the money
managers and the behavioral biases could be reduced significantly. It is extremely frustrating for
managers and investors to underperform and therefore managers have little incentive to be contrarian
regularly. However, if there is this new index for them to track, they would only be judged by the
investors for their relative performance compared to this index. In that sense, their risk tolerance would
change, and it would foster safer decisions.
87
One setback of this strategy is the need of the anti-bubble index. It requires some organization in order
to build the index. First of all it would be necessary to accurately select the components of the broader
market. Furthermore it would be necessary to determine a specific process to search for bubbles. The
methodology should be determined to avoid "case by case" evaluations. And finally both the selection
of base securities and the bubble searching should be updated in a timely manner to provide a daily
value for the anti-bubble index.
The Index could be provided by a number of different sources. A financial institution could perform this
function, either an investment bank such as Barclay's Capital which is famous for its Bond indexes, or
else an investment management advisor such as S&P and the Dow Jones group which are famous for
their Stock indexes. Another alternative would be to have this task in the hands of academia. The
Federal Reserve with its significant resources could provide both the technical skils necessary to build
the index, as well as the confidence that the market would need to fully embrace this idea.
5.1.1 Put protective strategy
One of the alternatives that managers could use to mimic the "Anti-bubble" style index would be to buy
some downside protection such as Put options. Such put options, particularly the long maturity ones,
are helpful to protect a portfolio once the prices of the underlying assets are going down. The flexibility
of put option allows mangers to precisely determine which share of their exposure they want to hedge.
They might want to hedge precisely to mimic the index, but they could also underweight or overweight
the put options to express views on the market and to search for some alpha to their portfolios. Another
positive characteristic of the put options is that managers can use them on a broad index such as the
S&P 500 to hedge a potential downturn in the stock markets, but managers could still hold a portfolio of
actively selected stocks that are not exactly the S&P 500. Once again the put option strategy proves to
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be flexible enough to allow managers to express their views of the market in search for alpha, while still
controlling their risks with the put. Finally puts can be easily found for different types of securities. They
are broadly available for stocks and futures, and also currently exist for ETFs that track some particular
index. Managers can use this flexibility by buying puts that track a given ETF that track a given index.
That suits manager's needs, and once the "anti-bubble" index is in place, there could even be options on
this index that could be used by investors to combine with short-termed risk-free assets to build low
risk portfolios that offers great liquidity and also good collateral for other transactions that might
require collateral.
5.2 Regulatory Alternative - Agency to map risks
This alternative is based on the concepts of two different industries: the oil industry and the air
transportation industry. Similar to what exists in the air transportation industry, this alternative suggests
the establishment of a new agency solely intended to assess the situation of the financial markets and to
search for crises. This agency would not focus on enacting any legislation or regulation, but only on
technically analyzing the markets and issuing alarms and recommendations, when the markets are in
hazardous situations. This alternative could be compared to the situation that now exists in the US
agencies that regulate and provide safety for the air travel industry. The National Transportation Safety
Board (37) is the agency empowered with the mission to analyze air accidents and to suggest solutions
for the problems that led to the accidents. The Federal Aviation Administration (38) is the main
regulator of the air industry and has the responsibility to generate adequate regulation based on the
NTSB analyses of the accidents and also on all other concerns that the FAA might have regarding air
safety and air travel efficiency. Similarly the financial markets could benefit from this structure. The
Federal Reserve, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange
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Commission (SEC) have the responsibility to regulate the markets. However, the financial markets still
lack an unbiased agency analogue to the NTSB to analyze vulnerabilities and eventual crashes of the
financial system. This new agency would be the main contact point for the Congress and other branches
of the government to discuss crises and preventive measures. This branch could be responsible to
prepare the Anti-bubble index, mentioned in the previous subsection.
Furthermore, similarly to what happens in the oil industry, this new agency could also have the
responsibilities to give some proper guidelines to the markets. An analogue function is performed by the
Energy Information Administration:
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects, analyzes, and disseminates
independent and impartial energy information to promote sound policymaking, efficient
markets, and public understanding of energy and its interaction with the economy and
the environment.
EIA Webiste (39)
This new agency could provide some realistic forecast bands for the prices of financial instruments. This
agency would use sound academic theory to provide guidelines for the markets to price the individual
securities - housing prices, stocks and bonds. That would be similar to the function that the EIA now
performs by forecasting oil prices for the next 40 years. This new agency could reduce some of the
cyclical effects that have lowered the growth pace of the overall economy, therefore improving the
efficiency of the economy.
Another function of this agency could be to analyze innovative financial instruments. The agency could
constantly search for new instruments and systemically analyze the new instruments to understand the
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way they fit into the overall market and the functions they perform. This agency could also be charged
with the mission to conduct stress tests not only of banks, but also of other large financial institutions
such as pension plans, hedge funds and even mutual funds, with the goal to assess whether or not these
institutions are prepared to endure possible downturn scenarios.
The existence of such an agency would help investors to better understand the vulnerabilities of the
market. Furthermore such an agency would be in a strong position to issue credible bubble warnings,
helping investors to avoid fueling a bubble. One of the tools that this new agency could use to help
control speculative runs is education. Lo (6) argues that education can make the financial markets better
prepared to withstand crises. One example of such an educative action would be to require some
particular buyers in some markets to sign a "Risk Notice" before acquiring an asset that is likely to
develop a bubble. By doing that, these investors, often not sophisticated, would get important
information that would help them make a better and more informed purchase decision. One example of
such situations would be to require regular homebuyers to sing "Risk Notices" when home prices are at
some given levels such as historical peaks. These notices would contain information regarding the prices
and also inform the buyer of the risks of a significant downturn. In that sense, such notices would make
this investors prepared for the possible scenarios and would make some of them to change their minds,
therefore reducing the severity of the bubble and making the less sophisticated investors less vulnerable
to bubbles. This would perform the same function as a "Liability Waiver" that is often signed in extreme
sport such as skydiving and shark-diving. Once the participant is required to sign the "Liability Waiver"
he or she knows of the risks incurred and therefore can reassess his decision before going forward. For
this reason, the number of people that suffers accidents in such extreme sports is significantly reduced,
since risk adverse people will decide to avoid the sport.
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6 Conclusion
This thesis has presented some of the key theories related to bubble dynamics. Important models, such
as Hyman Mink's and also the Efficient Market Hypothesis, were discussed and a new strategy was
developed to search for bubbles based on the combining of these theories. The important behavioral
biases discussed by Lo and Carroll completed the theoretical framework. This thesis also reviewed some
of the key historical bubbles and analyzed how these historical bubbles fit with existing bubble theories.
Based on a combination of these theories and their fit with past events, a new model to search for
bubbles was suggested. The Bubble Score model focuses on combining several inputs into an overall
score of likelihood to develop a bubble, in a procedure similar to the one conducted for a credit score.
These inputs come from the elements that theory suggests should be present during a bubble type of
event.
The Johanson-Ledoit-Sornette Model was also presented. This model uses historical prices to forecast
bubbles and crashes based on the assumptions of traders' decision-making that oscillate with time. Both
the JLS and the Bubble Score model were applied to US financial markets and each of the asset classes
was assessed for its likelihood to develop bubbles.
The results of the Bubble Score model indicated that U.S. Treasury bonds and corporate bonds were the
asset classes most likely to generate a bubble type of behavior. Further analysis of these two asset
classes indicated that the significant growth in the corporate bond industry was largely driven by the
growth in corporate profits and assets in general, therefore proving likely to be sustainable. On the
other hand, long-maturities treasury bonds scored higher on the model and hence presented a real risk.
The thesis presented evidence that risk from Treasury bonds comes from two factors: the credit risk and
the price variation in the secondary market. Despite the absence of credit risk, since US treasury bonds
are considered to be risk free, the treasury bond holders still face risks that come from their price
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formation in the secondary market. Investors that are not willing to hold the bonds to maturity may
experience losses by holding these bonds. The thesis also presented information from a speech given by
FED Chairman Ben Bernanke that states that yields on thirty-year treasuries may rise quickly, reaching
5% as early as 2016.
Finally, two alternatives were suggested to make the financial markets, and particularly prudent
investors, better prepared to endure the bubble type of events. These alternatives are intended to
reduce the severity of bubbles and also their frequency. The first alternative is the development of a
new "Anti-Bubble" type of investment, which consists of a new style of fund that would track an "Anti-
Bubble" Index. This index would be a broad market index that underweights asset classes that are prone
to bubble formation. The second alternative is the development of a new agency, with the mission to
analyze the financial markets and determine the best ways to forecast bubbles, and to do so on a
frequent basis. This agency would not have a regulatory mission, but instead would focus only on the
technical side of the analysis, in a framework similar to the one that now exists in the highly secure air
travel industry, in which the NTSB analyzes crashes and suggests improvements which the FAA uses to
enact new regulations.
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